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Abstract. In this paper1, we will argue that if we want to understand the function 
of the brain (or the control in the case of robots), we must understand how the 
brain is embedded into the physical system, and how the organism interacts with 
the real world. While embodiment has often been used in its trivial meaning, i.e. 
‘intelligence requires a body’, the concept has deeper and more important implica-
tions, concerned with the relation between physical and information (neural, 
control) processes. A number of case studies are presented to illustrate the 
concept. These involve animals and robots and are concentrated around 
locomotion, grasping, and visual perception. A theoretical scheme that can be 
used to embed the diverse case studies will be presented. Finally, we will establish 
a link between the low-level sensory-motor processes and cognition. We will 
present an embodied view on categorization, and propose the concepts of ‘body 
schema’ and ‘forward models’ as a natural extension of the embodied approach 
toward first representations. 
Introduction 
Intelligent behavior has always fascinated researchers. Traditionally, 
intelligence was attributed solely to the control or the neural system. In 
‘classical’ (also Good Old-Fashioned — GOFAI) Artificial Intelligence and 
cognitive science, the focus was on problem-solving through computation 
on internal symbolic representations of the world (e.g., Pylyshyn, 1987). In 
computational neuroscience, the focus is essentially on the simulation of 
certain brain regions. For example, in the ‘Blue Brain’ project (Markram, 
2006), the focus is, for the better part, on the simulation of cortical 
columns — the organism into which the brain is embedded does not play 
a major role in these considerations. However, recently there has been an 
increasing interest in the notion of embodiment in all disciplines dealing 
with intelligent behavior, including psychology, philosophy, artificial 
intelligence, linguistics, and neuroscience. In this paper, we explore the 
far-reaching and often surprising implications of embodiment for 
                                                          
1
 Parts of the ideas presented in this paper have appeared in previous publications; they will 
be referenced throughout the text. 
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behavior and for cognition. 
While embodiment has often been used in its trivial meaning, i.e. 
‘intelligence requires a body’, there are deeper and more important conse-
quences, concerned with connecting brain, body, and environment. The 
behavior of any system is not merely the outcome of an internal control 
structure (such as the central nervous system); it is also affected by the 
ecological niche in which the system is physically embedded, by its 
morphology (the shape of its body and limbs, as well as the type and 
placement of sensors and effectors), and by the material properties of the 
elements composing the morphology. This embedding impacts the physi-
cal as well as the information (neural, control) processes that all together 
manifest themselves in a particular behavior (Pfeifer & Bongard, 2007). 
Physical constraints shape the dynamics of the interaction of the 
embodied system with its environment (for example, because of the way 
it is attached to the body at the hip joint, during walking a leg behaves to 
some extent like a pendulum) and can be exploited to achieve stability 
and energy efficiency. We will speak about ‘intelligence by mechanics’ or 
‘morphological computation’ when morphology and materials take over 
some of the functions normally attributed to the brain (or the control). A 
direct link also exists between embodiment and information: coupled 
sensory-motor activity and body morphology induce statistical regulari-
ties in sensory input and within the control architecture and therefore 
enhance internal information processing (e.g., Lungarella & Sporns, 2006). 
The above-mentioned points apply to any agent interacting with its 
environment, animal or robot. We will present some case studies from 
biology, however, our selection will be biased toward case studies on 
robots. The advantage of using robots is that embodiment can be investi-
gated quantitatively: robots are much simpler to manipulate and monitor. 
That is, first, we can change the control structure without much effort, and 
we can even manipulate the morphology relatively easily. Second, all 
sensory stimulations, motor signals, and internal states can be recorded as 
time series for further analysis. Having discovered some principles or put 
forth some hypotheses, we can turn back into the biological realm and 
verify the ideas. Such a method corresponds to the synthetic modeling 
approach, or ‘understanding by building’ (Pfeifer & Scheier, 1999; Webb, 
2001). At the same time, these principles will enable us to design and 
build intelligent systems (computer programs, robots, other artifacts) for 
research and application purposes.  
We will demonstrate that embodiment not only plays a crucial part in 
low-level sensory-motor activities (such as locomotion), but also in 
capabilities that would be considered cognitive. To illustrate that, we 
present an embodied view on categorization. Still, we stop short of the so-
called higher-level cognitive capabilities such as planning, abstract 
reasoning, or language. In an effort to bridge this gap, we will sketch how 
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the bottom-up, embodied, approach can be naturally extended to form 
representations, providing a way to higher-level cognition. The way is 
through the concepts of ‘body schema’ and ‘forward models’. 
We will proceed as follows. First, we will present a number of case 
studies to illustrate the physical and information theoretic implications of 
embodiment. The case studies have been chosen from different domains 
— locomotion, grasping, and visual perception — to demonstrate the 
broad import of the concept of embodiment. Then we will deal with the 
extension of the concepts toward cognition. Finally, we will attempt to 
integrate the diverse case studies into a general overarching scheme that 
captures the essence of embodiment and morphological computation, and 
conclude. 
Locomotion Case Studies 
The fact that moving from one place to another, or locomotion, requires a 
body, comes as no surprise. However, it has been treated predominantly 
as a control problem by many; the body playing the part of a mere tool 
that has to be commanded appropriately. In this section, we will try to 
illustrate the contrary: shaping the body morphology and thereby the 
dynamics that result from the interaction with the environment can lead 
to stable and efficient locomotion, requiring very little control. We will 
illustrate these physical implications of being embodied on several 
machines and animals that walk or run. After that, a case study on leg 
coordination in insect walking will elucidate the impact of embodiment 
on information or control processes. 
Physical Implications of Embodiment in Locomotion 
In this section, we want to demonstrate that the body and its dynamics in 
the interaction with the environment, not control, are the key 
determinants of locomotion behavior. First, the passive dynamic walkers 
— brain-less machines — will serve as a powerful illustration of this 
concept. Second, we will present case studies that extend this idea to 
powered and controlled machines. However, the goal of the brain (or 
controller) is not to override, but to exploit the underlying body-
environment dynamics and only tune it or channel it in desired directions. 
We will demonstrate how such an approach leads to greater stability and 
energy efficiency. 
Passive dynamic walking. The passive dynamic walker, which goes back 
to McGeer (1990), is capable of walking down an incline without any 
actuation and without control. In other words, there are no motors, no 
sensors, and there is no microprocessor on the robot; it is brainless, so to 
speak. Its locomotion is an outcome of the slope of the incline (gravity is 
M. Hoffmann & R. Pfeifer 
34 
the only power source), and the mechanical parameters of the walker 
(mainly leg segment lengths, mass distribution, and foot shape). The 
original walker had four legs to provide stability in the lateral direction; 
Collins et al. (2001) have constructed a two-legged version which balances 
by using a counter-swing of the arms that are attached rigidly to their 
opposing legs (see Fig. 1, A). 
As the passive dynamic walkers demonstrate, locomotion can be 
realized through pure, but carefully tuned mechanics only. However, the 
‘ecological niche’ (i.e. the environment in which the robot is capable of 
operating) is extremely narrow: it only consists of inclines of certain 
angles. Therefore, the next objective is to extend this concept to machines 
with some practical capability — that can actively walk on level ground 
(or even uphill) and that can cope with rough terrain. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Passive dynamic and passive dynamic based walkers. (A) The Cornell 
passive dynamic walker. It walks completely passively down an incline (Collins et 
al., 2005). (B)-(D) Passive dynamic based walkers are an extension of passive 
dynamic walkers. Actuation is added, such that they can walk on flat ground , but 
the energy-efficiency thanks to the exploitation of passive dynamics is preserved 
(Collins et al., 2005). (B) is an actuated extension of the passive walker (A). 
 
Passive dynamic based walkers. These machines (Collins et al., 2005; 
Fig. 1, B-D) are a direct extension of the passive dynamic walking concept. 
Gravity (in the form of the incline) is substituted by small power sources. 
The robots can thus walk on level ground. However, they strive to 
preserve the advantages present in the entirely passive solution: minimal 
control and superior energy efficiency. The former goal can be illustrated 
on the Delft and Cornell bipeds that walk with simple control algorithms. 
Their only sensors detect ground contact, and their only motor commands 
are on/off signals issued once per step. The latter goal — superior energy 
efficiency — was also accomplished, as the cost of transport estimates 
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testify2.  
What is the reason for the unprecedented energy efficiency of the 
passive dynamic based walkers? It is a consequence of the careful design 
of the body and of the minimalistic control scheme that only ‘piggybacks’ 
onto the underlying body dynamics. As is well known in physics, energy 
transfer is maximum at resonant modes of a system. The passive dynamic 
walkers and their active descendants contain a number of elements with 
pendulum-like dynamics: (1) a simple pendulum corresponds to the 
passive swing of the leg forward; (2) an inverted pendulum describes the 
motion of the hip mass over the stance leg; (3) another inverted pendulum 
characterizes the lateral rocking motion of the walker. The step frequency, 
stride length, and speed of the robots that can be observed are a direct 
consequence of the natural dynamics (the pendulums operating at their 
eigenfrequencies) that are exploited by the controller.3 
The passive dynamic based walkers not only pave the way for 
energy-efficient robots of the future, but they also serve as models of 
human walking. The Cornell and Delft bipeds use anthropomorphic geo-
metry and mass distributions in their legs and demonstrate ankle push-off 
and powered leg swinging, both present in human walking. They walk 
with human-like motion and human-like efficiency (Collins et al., 2005). 
The ease of altering different parameters and observing their effects helps 
us to better understand human walking. 
Self-stabilization. Passive dynamic walkers have shown that locomotion 
can be realized through pure, but carefully tuned mechanics. However, 
how stable or adaptive is such a solution? In other words, how does a 
brainless machine cope with different slopes or with disturbances? The 
theory of nonlinear dynamical systems is often employed to analyze the 
phenomena involved in the mechanical (and also neural) aspects of loco-
motion. The walker is an example of a nonlinear dynamical system and 
walking patterns (which are periodic motions) correspond to limit cycles. 
Limit cycles in a nonlinear system can display attractive behavior, i.e. 
nearby trajectories are ‘pulled’ toward the limit cycle.  
Mechanical self-stability, i.e. robustness to disturbances through local 
attractivity of the mechanical system, has been shown in a physical 
(McGeer, 1990) and mathematical (Coleman et al., 1997) walking model. 
In hopping or running, the dynamics is even more prolific. Fig. 2 illus-
                                                          
2 The dimensionless mechanical specific cost of transport, cmt = (positive mechanical work of 
actuators)/(weight * distance travelled), was 0.055 for the Cornell biped, 0.08 for its Delft col-
league, which is similar to the value estimated for humans (0.05), but vastly outperforms the 
estimated value for the state-of-the-art Honda humanoid Asimo (1.6) (Collins et al., 2005). 
3 The problem of a controller, in this case a central pattern generator, adapting to the 
resonant frequencies of a walking machine has been addressed by Buchli & Ijspeert, 2008 
and Verdaasdonk et al., 2006. 
M. Hoffmann & R. Pfeifer 
36 
trates this phenomenon schematically. A monopod hopper driven by an 
open-loop controller compensates for disturbances without any explicit 
feedback mechanism, that is, without measuring the disturbances or 
altering the system. Self-stabilization has been investigated in a monopod 
(Ringrose, 1997), or quadruped (Poulakakis et al., 2006; Ringrose, 1997), 
for instance. Kubow & Full (1999) designed a dynamic model of a hexa-
pedal runner and observed the recovery from rotational, lateral, and fore-
aft velocity perturbations. Perturbations altered the translation and/or 
rotation of the body that consequently provided mechanical feedback by 
altering leg moment arms. Koditschek et al. (2004) provide an excellent 
review of the mechanical aspects of legged locomotion, analyzing cock-
roaches in particular and showing how this inspired the construction of 
the RHex robot — a robot with unprecedented mobility (Saranli et al., 
2001). These studies show that running on rough terrain can be accomp-
lished with simple feed-forward control in concert with a mechanical 
system that stabilizes passively. In the biological realm, the intrinsic 
properties of muscles further aid self-stability (Blickhan et al., 2007) and 
further assist in making the neural contribution to locomotion control 
simpler. 
Body dynamics vs. control. This confrontation is already expressed in 
McGeer’s original paper (McGeer, 1990). The passive dynamic walker has 
nothing but (passive body) dynamics. On the other end of the spectrum 
are traditional robots with strong emphasis on control. The Honda 
humanoid Asimo often serves as a representative of state-of-the-art of this 
approach to robot locomotion. We identify the following characteristics: 
(1) joint trajectories are planned and enforced rather than negotiated in 
interaction with the environment; (2) stabilization is achieved actively 
(through the famous zero-moment point control scheme: Vukobratovic & 
Vorovac, 2004) rather than passively; (3) stiff, high-power, and high-fre-
quency actuation is used. As a consequence of these characteristics, both 
computational and energetic requirements are high. On the other hand, 
the robot is very versatile — it can move its limbs into every possible 
position, it can walk uphill, downhill, even up and down the stairs. 
By contrast, all the passive dynamic walker can do is walk, and it can 
only walk down an incline. Nevertheless, the descendants of the passive 
dynamics exploitation approach, the passive dynamic based walkers 
(Collins et al., 2005) or RHex (Saranli et al., 2001), demonstrate that the 
narrow ecological niche can be gradually expanded, while preserving the 
merits of this approach.  
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Fig. 2. Self-stabilization. Adaptivity is part of the mechanical structure itself. 
(A) Picture of a two-dimensional underactuated monoped hopping robot attached 
to a central rod with a rotational joint (courtesy of A. Seyfarth and A. Karguth). 
(B) A schematic representation of the hopping robot in the different phases of 
locomotion: flight, touchdown (TD) [with angle of attack (AOA)], and takeoff 
(TO). Only the joint depicted by the black circle (hip joint) is actuated, the knee 
(white circle) is passive, and the lower limb is attached to the upper limb with a 
simple spring. (C) Output of a simulation of the robot. The upper part of the panel 
shows the trajectory of the model over time as a sequence of stick figures; in the 
lower part, the angle of attack (the angle at which the leg hits the ground) is 
plotted. The model exhibits a stable hopping gait with a periodic hip motor 
oscillation, as indicated by the constant AOA at every step in the left side of the 
panel. At distance d = 0 m, there is a step in the ground that disturbs the robot’s 
movement but to which the robot adapts without the need for any changes in the 
control. This purely mechanical phenomenon is called self-stabilization (Figure 
from Pfeifer et al., 2007; there adapted from Blickhan et al., 2007). 
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Information Theoretic Implications of Embodiment in Locomotion 
The view presented in the previous section overly polarizes the situation. 
Body and brain should not be viewed as competitors, but rather collabora-
tors. The tasks can be distributed and accomplished by the substrate that 
is more appropriate. What we have demonstrated so far is that in many 
locomotion-related tasks, the body itself is the candidate of choice. Never-
theless, for versatile locomotion, control is indispensable. Traditionally, 
control algorithms need to be fed with information about the state of the 
system, as obtained from sensors. Based on that, a decision, regarding the 
leg coordination for instance, is taken centrally. However, there are 
alternatives to the centralized control paradigm, which take embodiment 
into account. What we want to elucidate in this section is that embodi-
ment is as important for the physical processes as it is for the informa-
tional processes. The inputs to a control scheme necessarily come through 
the body dynamics (see Iida & Pfeifer, 2006, for an account on sensing 
through body dynamics in a dynamic quadruped robot). The following 
case study illustrates how the body and interaction with the environment 
can replace a central communication between legs in insect walking. 
Leg Coordination in Insect Walking4. Leg movements in insects are 
controlled by largely independent local neural circuits that are connected 
to their neighbors. There is no central controller that coordinates the legs 
during walking. The leg coordination comes about by the exploitation of 
the interaction with the environment (Cruse, 1990; Cruse et al., 2002). If 
the insect stands on the ground and moves forward by pushing 
backwards with one of its legs, as an unavoidable implication of being 
embodied, all the joint angles of the legs standing on the ground will 
instantaneously change. The insect’s body is pushed forward, and 
consequently the other legs are also pulled forward and the joints will be 
bent or stretched. This fact can be exploited to the animal’s advantage. All 
that is needed is angle sensors in the joints — and they do exist — for 
measuring the change, and there is global communication between the 
legs! But the communication is through the interaction of the agent with 
the environment, not through neural processing. 
Inspired by the fact that the local neural leg controllers need only 
exploit this global communication, a neural network architecture called 
WalkNet has been developed which is capable of controlling a six-legged 
robot (Dur et al., 2003). This instance of morphological computation takes 
over part of the task that would have to be done by the brain — the 
communication between the legs and the calculation of the angles on all 
the joints — is performed by the interaction between the insect and the 
world. 
                                                          
4 This case study has previously appeared in Pfeifer & Gomez, 2009. 
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Grasping Case Studies 
At first sight, grasping and locomotion do not seem to have much in 
common. However, as we will show in this section, the implications of 
embodiment illustrated thus far in locomotion can be equally well 
demonstrated in case studies that involve grasping. In essence, the rich 
and dynamic interactions of walking or running bodies with the ground 
will be replaced by equally complex interactions of hand morphologies 
and objects being grasped. 
Physical Implications of Embodiment in Grasping 
In this section, we discuss how morphology and materials contribute to 
grasping behavior. Hand joint structure, muscle mechanics, and the distri-
bution and density of bone to joint movements and muscle recruitment 
during manipulative behavior are all important variables, as investigated 
by Marzke & Marzke (2000). It has also been reported that ridged struc-
ture of human skin offers better grip due to increased friction (Cartmill, 
1979). However, we will use two robotic case studies for our illustration of 
‘cheap grasping’, i.e. grasping that is stable and reliable, yet requires little 
control. First, we will demonstrate a robotic hand, in which the attention 
paid to the mechanical construction leads to self-adaptation of the grasp 
to different objects. Second, we will present a recent universal robotic 
gripper, where the morphological approach was taken to its extreme.  
Cheap Grasping with a Robotic Hand5. The 18 degrees-of-freedom 
(DOF) tendon driven ‘Yokoi hand’ (Yokoi et al., 2004; Fig. 3) which can be 
used as a robotic and a prosthetic hand, is partly built from elastic, 
flexible, and deformable materials (this hand comes in many versions 
with different materials, morphologies, sensors, etc.; here we only 
describe one of them). The tendons are elastic, the fingertips are 
deformable and between the fingers there is also deformable material. 
 
 
Fig. 3: ‘Cheap’ grasping with a robotic hand: exploiting system-environment 
interaction. (A) The Yokoi hand exploits deformable and flexible materials to 
achieve self-adaptation through the interaction between environment and mate-
rials. (B)-(C) Final grasp of different objects. The control is the same, but the beha-
vior is very different.  
                                                          
5
 This case study has previously appeared in Pfeifer & Gomez, 2009. 
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When the hand is closed, the fingers will, because of the anthropomorphic 
morphology, automatically come together. For grasping an object, a 
simple control scheme, a ‘close’ is applied. Because of the morphology of 
the hand, the elastic tendons, and the deformable fingertips, the hand will 
automatically self-adapt to the object it is grasping. 
Cheap grasping with a universal gripper. As our everyday experience 
confirms, a multifingered hand is an extremely dexterous manipulator. 
However, from a robotic perspective, this approach is highly complex 
from a hardware as well as software point of view. Brown et al. (2010) 
have therefore devised a gripper that utilizes a completely different 
strategy. Individual fingers are replaced by a single mass of granular 
material (e.g., ground coffee). The principle of operation is illustrated in 
Fig. 4, D. The ‘bag’ containing granular material is pressed onto an object, 
flows around it, and conforms to its shape. Then, a vacuum pump is used 
to evacuate air from the gripper, which makes the granular material jam 
and stabilize the grasp. The gripper conforms to arbitrary shapes 
passively, that is without any sensory feedback, thanks to its morpho-
logical properties only. Brown et al. identify three mechanism that contri-
bute to the gripping: (i) geometric constraints from interlocking between 
gripper and object surfaces; (ii) static friction from normal stresses at 
contact; and (iii) an additional suction effect, if the gripper membrane can 
seal off a portion of the object’s surface. The properties of the gripper can 
be changed by using a different granular material. Objects of various 
shapes (see Fig. 4, E) as well as hardness (from steel springs to raw eggs) 
can be gripped. An additional advantage is that the orientation of objects 
that are picked up and placed again does not change. 
In the two case studies presented, there is no need for the agent to 
‘know’ beforehand what the shape of the to-be-grasped object will be 
(which is normally the case in robotics, where the contact points are calcu-
lated before the grasping action: Molina-Vilaplana et al., 2007). In the first 
study, the shape adaptation is taken over by the morphology of the hand, 
the elasticity of the tendons, and the deformability of the fingertips, as the 
hand interacts with the shape of the object. In the second study, the 
physical properties of the granular material and how they change when 
air is evacuated play a key part. In both cases, control of grasping is very 
simple, or, in other words, very little ‘brain power’ is required. Clearly, 
these designs have their limitations; for fine manipulation more sophisti-
cated sensing, actuation, and control may be required (Borst et al., 2002). 
However, a powerful fundament on which the next layers can rest has 
been provided. 
For prosthetics, there is an interesting implication. EMG signals can 
be used to interface the robot hand non-invasively to a patient: even 
though the hand has been amputated, he or she can still intentionally 
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produce muscle innervations which can be picked up on the surface of the 
skin by EMG electrodes. If EMG signals, which are known to be very 
noisy, are used to steer the movement of the hand, control cannot be very 
precise and sophisticated. But by exploiting the self-regulatory properties 
of the hand, there is no need for very precise control, at least for some 
kinds of grasping: the relatively poor EMG signals are sufficient for the 
basic movements (Hernandez Arieta et al., 2006; Yu et al., 2006).  
 
 
 
Fig. 4. Jamming-based grippers for picking up a wide range of objects without 
the need for active feedback. (A) Attached to a fixed-base robot arm. (B) Picking 
up a shock absorber coil. (C) View from the underside. (D) Schematic of operation. 
(E) Holding force Fh for several three-dimensional-printed test shapes (the dia-
meter of the sphere shown on the very left, 2r = 25.4 mm, can be used for size 
comparison). The thin disk could not be picked up at all (from Brown et al., 2010, 
courtesy John Amend of Cornell University). 
 
Information Theoretic Implications of Embodiment in Grasping 
As we have seen, and similarly to the locomotion case, morphology and 
material properties can take over a significant part of a grasping task. 
However, in more complex scenarios, mechanical ‘intelligence’ has to be 
aided by software or control. In order for a controller to be able to take the 
right decisions and issue proper motor commands, it needs to perceive 
the relevant information regarding the agent’s interaction with the 
environment. Our goal in this section is to emphasize that the body 
morphology is as important for the perception task, as it is for taking 
actions. We have picked slippage sensing for our case study — a pre-
requisite for stable grasping and fine object manipulation — and we will 
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show how the particular shape and material properties of an artificial skin 
can facilitate perception. 
Slippage detection. In humans, the ridged skin structure not only im-
proves the mechanics of grasping as mentioned above, but also magnifies 
the pressure (which can be perceived) exerted by the manipulated object 
(Fearing & Hollerbach, 1984), and acts as a frequency filter for specific 
skin mechanoreceptors (Scheibert et al., 2009). Similar properties are 
desirable in robotic or prosthetic hands. A wide range of tactile sensors 
have been developed for slippage detection which use different transduc-
tion principles: piezoelectric sensors sensitive to vibrations, skin with 
round ridges and strain sensors, vibrating nibs on the skin surface sensed 
by accelerometers, or brushes on top of capacitive membranes (see the 
references in Damian et al., 2010). The morphology and material proper-
ties are significantly involved in all of those designs. In what follows, we 
want to look in detail into yet another solution where morphology 
maximizes the information that can be acquired about a slippage event.  
Damian et al. (2010) devised a tactile sensor consisting of a silicone 
skin layer with ridges a few millimeters apart which transduces surface 
events to a force sensing resistor beneath (Fig. 5, A). Whereas a flat skin 
 
 
Fig. 5: Slippage detection through ridged skin. (A) Schematics of the artificial 
skin. Silicone skin with evenly spaced ridges is glued over a Force Sensing 
Resistor (FSR). (B) Robotic hand equipped with artificial ridged skin. (C) Signal 
generated by an object sliding over a skin without ridges (left), and with ridges 
4 mm apart (right). The ridged skin provides a stronger signal with higher am-
plitude. In addition a clear periodic pattern allows for detection of slippage 
speed. (Damian et al., 2010) 
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without ridges, which was used as a reference, fails to detect an object 
sliding over it, ridged skin gives rise to peaks in the pressure sensor 
readings. Moreover, the frequency of the pressure signal obtained is 
directly proportional to the slippage speed and inversely proportional to 
the distance between ridges. The inter-ridge distance itself was found to 
further influence the quality of frequency encoded information. Among 
all skins, the one with a 4 mm spacing between ridges yielded discrimina-
tory peak frequencies for each velocity (Fig. 5, C). The skin was after-
wards employed in a robotic hand to stabilize grip. In summary, in this 
study, much of the electronic and algorithmic complexity present in other 
tactile sensing approaches has been successfully off-loaded to the 
morphology and allowed to detect slippage and gauge its speed with 
theoretically a single force sensor. 
 
Visual Perception Case Studies 
Unlike walking or grasping, seeing seems to be concerned exclusively 
with perception rather than action. The goal is to acquire useful informa-
tion from the environment that can be used to perform various tasks. 
Nevertheless, embodiment plays a key role in the information that can be 
acquired and such information theoretic implications of embodiment for 
visual perception will be the topic of this section.  
A prominent theory of visual perception was proposed by David 
Marr (1982): vision was treated as a stage-like computational process 
proceeding from a two-dimensional visual array (retina/camera image) to 
a three-dimensional description of the world as output. Whereas this 
approach has lead to many successes in computer vision, robots still fall 
short of the capabilities that humans and animals demonstrate in object 
recognition, identification, and scene understanding in unstructured 
environments. 
An alternative, and perhaps a remedy to the shortcomings of the 
treatment of visual perception as image processing, can be provided by 
embodiment. The scope of the investigation of visual perception has to be 
broadened to the generation of raw input image. The amount of informa-
tion present in the input flow is shaped by two factors: (1) morphology of 
the sensory apparatus; and (2) active generation of information through 
sensory-motor coordination. We will address these factors separately in 
the sections below, but we want to stress that they always act con-
currently. 
Thus far, we have been referring to the information theoretic implica-
tions of embodiment in a mostly informal sense. However, the informa-
tion content or structure present in the sensory and motor modalities can 
be quantified. Lungarella & Sporns (2006) presented several methods for 
measuring the (undirected) information present in sensory modalities 
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(Shannon entropy, mutual information, integration, and complexity). To 
extract directed, or causal, relationships, such as from sensors to motors 
or vice versa, they employed transfer entropy; however, other measures 
are also available, as analyzed in Lungarella et al., 2007). Polani and col-
leagues have devised a different measure, empowerment, which mea-
sures how much influence an agent has on its environment, but only that 
influence that can be sensed by the agent’s own sensors (see e.g., Jung et 
al., 2011). Yet another embodiment quantification method was presented 
recently by Thornton (2010), testifying the recent attention given to this 
subject. One of his case studies features a passive dynamic walker that we 
have (less formally) analyzed in the section on locomotion. Although such 
analysis tools are equally suited for animals and robots engaged in 
behavior, robots, as we have already discussed, are significantly easier to 
monitor and manipulate. Following the synthetic modeling approach, we 
will thus emphasize case studies on robots. 
The Role of Eye Morphology in Visual Perception 
Human eye. The retina of a human eye is a variable resolution sensor: the 
distribution of photoreceptors is non-homogeneous. The density of cones, 
which are used for high acuity vision, is greatest in the center (fovea) (e.g., 
Curcio et al., 1990). Through this morphological arrangement, a limited 
number of sensing and processing elements can provide both high acuity 
in the center of the visual field, and a wide field of view. In robots, the 
retinal morphology can be emulated by the log-polar transformation (e.g., 
Sandini & Metta, 2002), and the degree of variable resolution can be 
scaled arbitrarily. Martinez et al. (2010a) investigated this effect in a robot 
with two eyes performing vergence behavior (simultaneous movement of 
both eyes in opposite directions to obtain single binocular vision). The 
sensor morphology as represented by the log-polar transform clearly 
manifests itself in the information structure calculated on a sequence of 
images obtained from the robot. A similar phenomenon was observed by 
Lungarella & Sporns (2006). There, a simulated wheeled robot (but with a 
human-inspired eye) was driving around colored objects and foveated on 
them. 
Insect eye6. It has been shown that for many objectives (e.g. obstacle 
avoidance) motion detection is all that is required. Motion detection can 
often be simplified if the light-sensitive cells are not spaced evenly, but if 
there is a non-homogeneous arrangement. For instance, Franceschini and 
co-workers (1992) found that in the compound eye of the house fly the 
spacing of the facets is denser toward the front of the animal. This non-
homogeneous arrangement, in a sense, compensates for the phenomenon 
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 This case study has been adapted from Pfeifer & Gomez, 2009. 
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of motion parallax, i.e. the fact that at constant speed, objects on the side 
travel faster across the visual field than objects towards the front: it 
performs the ‘morphological computation’, so to speak. Allowing for 
some idealization, this implies that under the condition of straight flight, 
the same motion detection circuitry — the elementary motion detectors, 
or EMDs — can be employed for motion detection for the entire eye, a 
principle that has also been applied to the construction of navigating 
robots (e.g., Hoshino et al., 2000). In experiments with artificial evolution 
on real robots, it has been shown that certain aims, e.g. keeping a constant 
lateral distance to an obstacle, can be solved by proper morphological 
arrangement of the ommatidia, i.e. denser frontally than laterally without 
changing anything inside the neural controller (Lichtensteiger, 2004; Fig. 
6). Because the sensory stimulation is only induced when the robot (or the 
insect) moves in a particular way, this is also called information self-
structuring (or more precisely, self-structuring of the sensory stimulation), 
which leads us to the next section. 
 
 
 
Fig. 6. Morphological computation through sensor morphology — the Eyebot. 
The specific non-homogeneous arrangement of the facets compensates for motion 
parallax, thereby facilitating neural processing. (A) Insect eye. (B) Picture of the 
Eyebot. (C) Front view: the Eyebot consists of a chassis, an on-board controller, 
and sixteen independently-controllable facet units, which are all mounted on a 
common vertical axis. A schematic drawing of the facet is shown on the right. Each 
facet unit consists of a motor, a potentiometer, two cog-wheels and a thin tube 
containing a sensor (a photo diode) at the inner end. These tubes are the primitive 
equivalent of the facets. 
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Active Vision 
The previous section has demonstrated how a particular sensor morpho-
logy affects the information structure of the raw data that reaches the 
sensor and that enters subsequent processing afterwards. However, the 
sensory stimulation is not passively received, but rather actively 
generated. The point we want to make was beautifully expressed by John 
Dewey already in 1896 (Dewey, 1896):  
We begin not with a sensory stimulus, but with a sensory-motor coordina-
tion […] In a certain sense it is the movement which is primary, and the sen-
sation which is secondary, the movement of the body, head, and eye muscles 
determining the quality of what is experienced. In other words, the real 
beginning is with the act of seeing; it is looking, and not a sensation of light. 
Only much later was Dewey’s visionary observation picked up by 
research in active perception (e.g. Bajcsy, 1988; Churchland et al., 1994; 
Gibson, 1979; Noe, 2004).  
Again, we will pick a robotic case study to illustrate this point. Lun-
garella & Sporns (2006) used an upper torso humanoid robot (Fig. 7, A) to 
evaluate the contribution of sensory-motor coupling to different informa-
tional measures by comparing two experimental conditions. In both 
conditions, the robot arm was following a preprogrammed trajectory. The 
movement of the ball results in a displacement of the ball relative to the 
head and leads to physical stimulation in the head-mounted camera. In 
the first condition, which we will refer to as ‘fov’, the sensory feedback is 
exploited by the controller of the robot head with camera to track the end-
effector (orange ball). In other words, the sensory-motor loop (Fig. 7, B) 
was ensuring the orange ball stays at the center of the visual field — the 
fovea. In the second condition, ‘rnd’, the movement of the camera is 
unrelated to the movement of the ball (sensory-motor coupling is 
disrupted). The amount of information in the sequence of camera images 
was measured for both conditions (Fig. 7, C). As can be seen, there is more 
information structure in the case of the foveation condition for all 
measures; for example, the dark region in the center of the entropy panel 
indicates that entropy is clearly diminished in the center of the visual field 
(disorder has been reduced, or in other words, information structure has 
been induced), which is due to foveation being a sensory-motor coor-
dinated behavior. Similar results were reported by Martinez et al. (2010a), 
who used a head with two cameras. In their case, coordinated behavior 
consisted in vergence, i.e. both eyes tracking salient objects. Moreover, 
Martinez et al. (2010a) also showed that it is not arbitrary coordinated 
behavior that generates information structure. A different behavior, one 
eye tracking the object and the other following its movements, i.e. without 
vergence, did not generate more information structure than random 
behavior. Although this behavior may seem sensory-motor coordinated to 
The Implications of Embodiment for Behavior and Cognition: Animal and Robotic Case Studies 
 47 
the outside observer, it does not match the robot’s morphology, in this 
case the sensory apparatus. This illustrates the point that morphology and 
active perception cannot be considered in isolation. 
 
 
 
Fig. 7. Information self-structuring. (A) Picture of the robot, a small humanoid 
with a pan-tilt head equipped with a camera. (B) Schematic representation of the 
experimental setup. (C) Various measures to capture information structure: 
entropy (the amount of disorder in the system), mutual information (the extent to 
which the activity of one pixel can be predicted from the combined activities of 
neighboring pixels), integration (a measure of global coherence), and complexity (a 
measure that captures global coherence and local variation). The measures are 
applied to the camera image in the case of the foveation condition (top) and 
random condition (bottom). (From Pfeifer et al., 2007; there adapted from 
Lungarella & Sporns, 2006) 
 
Information structure in individual sensory modalities, such as in the 
visual modality as shown above, is definitely a prerequisite for subse-
quent processing. However, for effective control of behavior we are also 
interested in relations between modalities, and in relations in time. In 
particular, we are interested in directed relations in time, such as the ones 
between motor and sensory modalities, which may indicate causal 
relations. Sensory-motor coordinated behavior increases the directed 
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information flow, as measured using transfer entropy (Lungarella & 
Sporns, 2006; Martinez et al., 2010b). Such relations can be further ex-
ploited by the agent to learn to predict the consequences of its behavior. 
Moreover, predictability in the sensory-motor loop can be used to drive 
development (e.g., Oudeyer et al., 2007). Learning and representing the 
relations that exist between sensory and motor modalities constitute the 
first traces of cognition and will be the subject of the next section. 
From Sensory-motor Interaction to Embodied Cognition 
Thus far, we have been dealing with relatively low-level tasks such as 
locomotion, grasping, or simple visual perception. We have shown that 
such tasks can be performed without sophisticated cognitive processing, 
but rather through exploitation of body dynamics and interaction with the 
environment. While this research is interesting in itself, how does it relate 
to higher-level cognition? We will provide the link in this section.  
Embodied Categorization7 
For an autonomous embodied agent acting in the real world (e.g., an 
animal, a human, or a robot), perceptual categorization — the ability to 
make distinctions — is a hard problem (Harnad, 2005). First, based on the 
stimulation impinging on its sensory arrays (sensation) the agent has to 
rapidly determine and attend to what needs to be categorized. Second, the 
appearance and properties of objects or events in the environment being 
classified fluctuate continuously, for example owing to occlusions, or 
changes of distances and orientations with respect to the agent. And third, 
the environmental conditions (e.g., illumination, viewpoint, and back-
ground noise) vary considerably. There is much relevant work in com-
puter vision that has been devoted to extracting scale- and translation-
invariant low-level visual features and high-level multidimensional 
representations for the purpose of robust perceptual categorization 
(Riesenhuber & Poggio, 2002). Following this approach, however, catego-
rization often turns out to be a very difficult if not an impossible computa-
tional feat, especially when sufficiently detailed information is lacking. 
A solution that can only be pursued by embodied agents — but is not 
available when using a purely disembodied (i.e., computational) 
approach — is that through their interaction with the environment, agents 
generate the sensory stimulation required to perform the proper categori-
zation and thus drastically simplify the problem of mapping sensory 
stimulation onto perceptual categories. The most typical and effective 
way is through a process of sensory-motor coordination. One demonstra-
tion of how sensory-motor coordination influences category formation 
                                                          
7
 This section has been adapted from Pfeifer et al., 2008. 
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can be found in the experiments by Pfeifer & Scheier (1997). These experi-
ments show that mobile robots can reliably categorize big and small 
wooden cylinders only if their behavior is sensory-motor coordinated. A 
similar point is illustrated by the artificial evolution experiments of Beer 
(2003), where a simulated agent learns to discriminate between circular 
and diamond-shaped objects, or Nolfi (2002). The fittest agents, that is, 
those that most reliably categorized different kind of objects, were those 
engaging in sensory-motor coordinated behavior. Intuitively, in these 
examples, the interaction with the environment (a physical process) 
creates additional (i.e., previously absent) sensory stimulation, which is 
highly structured, thus facilitating subsequent information processing. 
Let us compare the categories that we have just come across with 
categories as symbols as we know them from classical symbolic AI. 
Taking Beer’s case study, if it was realized in a symbolic architecture, we 
should find a ‘diamond’ symbol, which represents the diamonds and onto 
which the instances of diamonds in the real world need to be mapped (a 
nontrivial task, as described above). Moreover, the pitfall of this approach 
is that cognitive processing becomes detached from real world interaction 
and from meaning for the agent (the notorious symbol grounding 
problem: Harnad, 1990). On the other hand, when one examines the 
control architectures used by Pfeifer & Scheier (1997) or by Beer (2003), it 
is not possible to identify a site where the categories (big vs. small 
cylinders, or circles vs. diamonds) reside. Beer’s dynamical systems 
analysis of the behaving agent does not reveal clear neural correlates of 
‘circles’ or ‘diamonds’ either. Rather than corresponding to ‘labels’ 
defined from the outside, the categories are in fact behaviors. A small 
cylinder can be grasped, whereas a big one cannot; a circle is caught by 
the agent, whereas a diamond is avoided. Thus, categories are intrin-
sically meaningful to the agent and they are emergent from complex 
system-environment dynamics (see also Kuniyoshi et al., 2004).  
On the other hand, it is probably fair to say that the discrimination 
tasks the agents were engaged in were of limited complexity. The oppo-
nents therefore rightly raise the question of scalability (e.g., Edelman, 
2003) and argue that clearly identifiable representations allowing for 
hierarchical abstractions are necessary to tackle more complex scenarios. 
However, the dynamical systems framework and the concept of attractors 
that we have witnessed in the section dealing with stability in locomotion 
can provide a solution here. Kuniyoshi et al. (2004) or Pfeifer & Bongard 
(2007, ch.5), explain how, adopting the dynamical systems perspective, 
discretely identifiable states emerge as attractors in the combined physical 
and neural system of an agent. For instance, such symbols (or proto-
symbols) could be gaits in a running quadruped, or they can be ‘catego-
rizing behaviors’. On top of these proto-symbols, further, more cognitive 
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but still grounded, processing can take place.8 
Body Schema and Forward Models 
As we have seen in the previous section, the distinction between cognitive 
and sensory-motor starts to blur. Categorization, perception, but even me-
mory processes turn out to be directly coupled to sensory-motor processes 
and thus to embodiment (e.g., Edelman, 1987; Glenberg, 1997; Pfeifer & 
Scheier, 1999). What is the natural way in which an agent interacting with 
the world can gradually acquire cognition? We propose to follow a 
bottom-up and developmental pathway. Rather than starting from 
representations of objects or the world around the agent, we propose to 
start representing the very basis: the agent’s body and its low-level 
interaction with the environment. In other words, as we have argued, any 
cognitive processing will always be mediated by the body and the 
sensory-motor loops. Therefore, these are the first candidates for an agent 
to learn about. 
Concepts that are currently being studied, mainly in neuroscience 
and psychology, are ‘body schema’ (e.g., De Preester & Knockaert, 2005; 
Haggard & Wolpert, 2005; Higuchi et al., 2006; Maravita et al., 2003) and 
‘forward’, or internal, models (Bays & Wolpert, 2007; Webb, 2004; Wolpert 
et al., 1998). Both concepts have also direct relevance for robotics (see e.g., 
Hoffmann et al., 2010, for a review). The body schema can be viewed as 
the sensory-motor ‘representation’ of the agent’s body and its action 
possibilities. Forward models enable agents to predict the consequences of 
their actions and are related to anticipatory behavior (e.g., Pezzulo, 2007). 
In more concrete terms, for instance, in the (uncertain, dynamic, 
potentially hostile) world out there, it may be of advantage to: (i) predict 
the next sensory feedback in advance — for instance, during rapid 
locomotion, biological feedback is too slow; (ii) distinguish self-generated 
sensory information from sensory input generated by the environment, 
leading to detection of changes in the environment9; or (iii) simulate 
different courses of action and choose the one with the best consequences. 
Whereas it is not surprising that humans possess such capabilities, they 
have been discovered even in much simpler animals. For instance, 
prediction is demonstrated in the motor preparation of the prey-catching 
behavior of the jumping spider (Schomaker, 2004). As another example, 
rats are able to compare alternative paths in a T-maze before actually 
acting, thus ‘planning in simulation’ (Hesslow, 2002).  
As discussed by Clark & Grush (1999), forward models are the 
                                                          
8
 Maass et al., 2004 provide a neurally inspired computational model of a two-tiered 
architecture that could be used to implement such a processing hierarchy.  
9
 For instance, it feels different when we move our eyes than when the world moves, 
although on the retina it may look the same. 
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simplest instances of circuitry that emulates the world outside and thus 
stands for something that is not currently present in the sensory and 
motor states. Thus, we may want to attribute representation to such 
circuitry. A ‘decoupled’ forward model that is not just a few steps ahead 
of the sensory-motor reality but that can be executed independently, in 
the brain only, can then be viewed as emulation/simulation of the 
interaction with the world, or world model. Interestingly, such a forward 
model can also be exploited to exercise embodied categorization, which 
we have presented in the previous section, in simulation. In other words, 
if the agent can predict the sensory consequences of its actions, it can also 
‘imagine’ catching a circle or diamond, or grasping a cylinder. The 
outcome of such internal simulation can be used to derive a perceptual 
judgment that would otherwise not have been possible. This is 
demonstrated by the agent of H. Hoffmann (2007), which uses such a 
‘mental’ rehearsal of driving in its environment to discriminate passages 
and dead ends. 
Let us now wrap up the nature of representations and cognition that 
we are acquiring. Rather than representing static features (such as 
objects), dynamic interaction patterns, which involve the robot acting in 
the environment, are represented. Such representations are best viewed as 
motor-based. They are action-oriented, originate in the sensory-motor 
apparatus and remain intimately related with it (Clark & Grush, 1999; 
Pezzulo, 2007)10. Whether we want to call these phenomena ‘cognitive’ 
depends on our definition of cognition. Some views reject the cogni-
tive/non-cognitive divide altogether, some include into the cognitive 
realm all kinds of adaptively valuable organism/ environment coupling 
(e.g., Thelen & Smith, 1994). While we consider these views equally 
legitimate, the view proposed by Clark & Grush (1999), among others, is 
that cognizers must display the capacity for environmentally decoupled 
thought and contemplation of options. This is exactly what a decoupled 
forward model provides: simulation of the world, or ‘mental imagery’. 
This phenomenon is believed to be at the core of grounded cognition 
(Barsalou, 2008; Gallese & Lakoff, 2005). 
Discussion and Conclusion 
We have seen a large variety of case studies. The question that immedia-
tely arises is whether there are general overarching principles governing 
all of them. A recently published scheme (Pfeifer et al., 2007) shows a 
potential way of integrating all of these ideas. 
We will use Fig. 8 to summarize the most important implications of 
embodiment and to embed our case studies into a theoretical context. 
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 As opposed to symbolic AI representations that are world-centered.  
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Driven by motor commands, the musculoskeletal system (mechanical 
system) of the agent acts on the external environment (task environment 
or ecological niche). The action leads to rapid mechanical feedback 
characterized by pressure on the bones, torques in the joints, and passive 
deformation of skin tissue. In parallel, external stimuli (pressure, 
temperature, and electromagnetic fields) and internal physical stimuli 
(forces and torques developed in the muscles and joint-supporting 
ligaments, as well as accelerations) impinge on the sensory receptors 
(sensory system). The patterns induced thus depend on the physical 
characteristics and morphology of the sensory systems and on the motor 
commands. Especially if the interaction is sensory-motor coordinated, as 
in foveation, reaching, or grasping movements, information structure is 
generated. The effect of the motor command strongly depends on the 
tunable morphological and material properties of the musculoskeletal 
system, where by tunable we mean that properties such as shape and 
compliance can be changed dynamically. All parts of this diagram are 
crucial for the agent to function properly, but only one part concerns the 
controller or the central nervous system. The rest can be seen as 
‘morphological computation’. 
 
 
 
Fig. 8: Overview of the implications of embodiment — the interplay of informa-
tion and physical processes (from Pfeifer et al., 2007; see text for details). 
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Let us now go through the case studies we have presented and locate 
them in Fig. 8. The passive dynamic walker is an instance of an interaction 
of the mechanical system with the environment solely — controller and 
sensory system are completely absent. Stabilization is achieved through 
the mechanical feedback loop shown in the lower left of the figure; in this 
case, the feedback is generated through ground reaction forces11. This 
scheme can be amended by a feed-forward controller that blindly sends 
motor commands to the mechanical system. That is the case for the 
monopod in Fig. 2 or for the hexapod RHex. As there is still no sensory 
system, these robots can function in the real world only thanks to 
mechanical self-stabilization. The ‘cheap grasping’ case studies illustrate a 
similar concept. This time, the material and morphology of the 
hand/gripper serve to stabilize a grasp without sensing. By contrast, the 
passive dynamic based walkers feature a complete scheme already — 
there is a sensory system and a feedback path to the controller. However, 
the control is rudimentary and it is still the intrinsic dynamics of the body 
that plays a dominant role. As a consequence of this — the intrinsic body 
dynamics is exploited rather than overridden — the robots also demon-
strate unprecedented energy efficiency. 
The study on leg coordination in insect walking provides a bridge 
from the physical implications of embodiment (that we have reviewed in 
the previous paragraph) to the information theoretic ones. Insects, when 
walking, also exploit mechanical feedback generated through ground 
reaction forces, but rather than exploiting it for gait stabilization, they 
capitalize on exploiting the internal sensory stimulation generated in the 
joint angles as one leg pushes back (thus inducing changes in the joint 
angles of all the other legs that are standing on the ground). This process 
corresponds to the lower left part of Fig. 8 and the arrow pointing from 
the mechanical system to the sensory system. This information can then 
be used for local control of individual legs. The study on slippage 
detection in grasping illustrates the role of the morphology of the sensory 
system. The particular shape of the skin — its surface is covered by ridges 
— magnifies the pressure exerted by objects that are grasped, and at the 
same time acts as a frequency filter, allowing for simply slippage speed 
calculation.  
The case studies dealing with vision illustrate the effect of sensory 
morphology and sensory-motor coordination on the information structure 
that reaches a sensor. In the Eyebot, the ‘insect eye’ case study, given a 
certain behavioral pattern, e.g. moving straight, the robot induces sensory 
stimulation which has to be subsequently processed, for instance to 
achieve obstacle avoidance. The study shows that evolving a specific 
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 Note that the fact that the robot has no sensors and thus does not know anything about 
this mechanical feedback does not imply that there is no such feedback. 
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morphology of the facet distribution can take over a significant part of the 
‘processing’, producing already highly structured and easy to process 
information for the nervous system. This process corresponds to the outer 
loop from the controller via mechanical system to task environment, back 
to sensory system and controller. The active vision case studies 
demonstrate the effect of action on the quality of subsequent perception, 
highlighting the need to treat perception as an intrinsically active process. 
We have also shown that the amount of sensory information can be 
measured quantitatively and that sensor morphology and sensory-motor 
coordination always go hand in hand and have to match. 
There are two main conclusions that can be drawn from these case 
studies. First, it is important to exploit the dynamics in order to achieve 
energy-efficient and natural kinds of movements. The term ‘natural’ not 
only applies to biological systems, but artificial systems also have their 
intrinsic natural dynamics. Second, there is a kind of trade-off or balance: 
the better the exploitation of the dynamics, the simpler the control, the 
less neural processing will be required. Note that all this only works, if the 
agent is actually behaving in the real world and therefore is generating 
sensory stimulation. Once again, we see the importance of the motor 
system for the generation of sensory signals, or more generally for 
perception. It should also be noted that motor actions are physical 
processes, not computational ones, but they are computationally relevant, 
or put differently, relevant for neural processing, which is why we use the 
term ‘morphological computation’. 
Having said all this, it should be mentioned that there is an 
additional trade-off. The more the specific environmental conditions are 
exploited — and the passive dynamic walker is an extreme case — the 
more the agent’s success will be contingent upon them. Thus, if we really 
want to achieve brain-like intelligence, the brain (or the controller) must 
have the ability to quickly switch to different kinds of exploitation 
schemes either neurally, or mechanically through morphological change. 
Finally, we have sketched a pathway how cognition can naturally 
emerge on top of the low-level sensory-motor processes the body is 
engaged in. It is the body and the interaction with the environment that 
are the natural candidates for first primitive representations. We want to 
point out that cognition is in the service of behavior here. That is, these 
first representations or models have to bring behavioral advantage. We 
have shown how this is indeed the case in simple situations where a 
forward model can provide an estimate of the future consequences of an 
action. As these simple predictive mechanisms become progressively 
more decoupled and autonomous, and as perhaps other processes start 
operating on top of them, a natural transition toward cognitive processes, 
which are still grounded and meaningful for the agent, has been 
accomplished. Therefore, unlike the original radical thesis of Brooks 
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(1991), an embodied approach need not be anticomputationalist or anti-
representationalist (Clark, 1997). Only, our view of computation and 
representation may have to be broadened. 
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